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Abstract
Empirical as well as experimental evidence strongly suggests that bidders
in common value auctions typically do not conform to the requirements of per-
fect rationality. Eyster and Rabin (2005) develop a theory and an equilibrium
concept ￿ ￿-cursed equilibrium ￿ for bounded rational bidding in common
value auctions (among other situations), and also present some experimental
evidence supporting the theory. This paper comments on these ￿ndings of an
experiment conducted at the University of Bergen. In the experiment, par-
ticipants often demonstrate behaviour that is beyond the bounds set by the
￿-cursed equilibrium theory, and I present an alternative theory that better
explains the experimental ￿ndings.
JEL classi￿cation numbers: C91, D44.
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11 Introduction
Economic theory often places rather tough rationality requirements on economic
agents, and the theory of common value auctions is a case in point. Rational behav-
iour in even the simplest form of a common value auction ￿ with a given number of
risk-neutral bidders (see e.g., Wilson (1977)) ￿ involves understanding a nexus of
intricate e⁄ects. One example is the existence of adverse selection: in any symmetric
bidding equilibrium, the winner is the one who most overestimates the true value.
A rational bidder would therefore bid less than his/her estimate of the true value.1
The requirements of full rationality seem to be too much for people participating in
real-life auctions, and it should therefore not come as a surprise that empirical as
well as experimental studies have found many instances of less than perfectly ratio-
nal behaviour. In controlled experiments with inexperienced bidders in particular,
the winner￿ s curse turns out to be more the rule than the exception (See e.g., Kagel,
Levin, Battalio and Meyer (1989)).
When theory and reality do not match, the theory will eventually have to give in.
One problem facing scholars trying to rebuild their theories to ￿t better with avail-
able data is that while there is in some sense only one way to be rational, behaviour
can be boundedly rational in so many ways. An interesting attempt to mend the
theory of common value auctions is made by Eyster and Rabin (2005). They allow
their bidders to be boundedly rational in the following way: the least rational of
their bidders is able to predict the distribution of the other bidders￿bids (signals)
but does not see any connection between these bids and the underlying information
about the true value. In contrast, their most rational players are perfectly ratio-
nal: they are able both to predict the distribution of bids (signals) and to infer the
underlying information, making them conform to the Nash equilibrium. To make
their analysis tractable, Eyster and Rabin assume that in any given auction, all
bidders are equally rational, somewhere in between these two extremes. They show
1Another example is the competition e⁄ect of more bidders: In private value auctions, if the
number of bidders increases, competition ￿ ares and each bidder bids more aggressively, ceteris
paribus. In common value auctions, however, the competition e⁄ect may well be dominated by the
adverse selection e⁄ect: more bidders also mean that the winner ￿ the greatest optimist ￿ will
be further from the average expectation.
2that the equilibrium bids can be expressed as a weighted average of the bids from
the two extremes, with relative weight ￿ assigned to the least rational alternative.
Intuitively, bidders with ￿ > 0 will be prone to su⁄er the winner￿ s curse, and ￿
is therefore to be interpreted as a ￿cursedness￿parameter. For this reason, Eyster
and Rabin let ￿￿￿cursed equilibrium￿denote the equilibrium corresponding to an
auction in which all bidders are of type ￿. Using data from other studies (Kagel
and Levin (1986)), they also present estimates of ￿ and ￿nd that most of the time,
the parameter falls within the admissible interval ￿ 2 [0;1].
The present paper adds to the ￿￿cursed equilibrium literature by conducting an
experiment tailored to investigate the ￿￿cursed equilibrium. The new data demon-
strate an interesting phenomenon: the estimated ￿ often fall outside the admissible
interval: values of ￿ exceeding 1 are frequently observed. One interpretation could
of course be that in this experiment participants were just performing badly in the
experiment, because of their lack of experience, but there is, however, a more plausi-
ble explanation: even in the least rational version of ￿￿cursed equilibrium (￿ = 1),
bidders are quite sophisticated: they cannot see the connection between other bid-
ders￿bids and their underlying signals, but they are able to predict perfectly the
distribution of their bids, which is, after all, quite an achievement. I therefore sug-
gest yet another version of the theory, in which fully rational bidders still play the
Nash equilibrium, while the least rational bidders simply bid their estimate. Ac-
tual bidders are still assumed to be equally rational and somewhere in between the
new boundaries. Actual bids are then still a weighted average of the bids from the
extremes, with relative weight ￿ assigned to the least rational alternative. This
equilibrium is dubbed ￿￿cursed equilibrium, and the estimates of ￿ typically fall
within the admissible interval ￿ 2 [0;1].
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I brie￿ y present Eyster
and Rabin￿ s (2005) model, including the results that are of importance to the present
paper. In Section 3, I present the experiment and demonstrate that i) for a sub-
stantial proportion of bidders, the estimated value of ￿ exceeds 1, suggesting that
these bidders are less rational (or less sophisticated) than is possible within the
￿￿cursed equilibrium framework; ii)there is large variation in the estimated indi-
3vidual cursedness parameters within each auction; and iii) the average high bidders
have a substantially higher ￿ than the average bidder. In Section 4, I present the al-
ternative bidding model and the associated ￿￿cursed equilibrium, and demonstrate
that most bidders behave according to this theory. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Common Value Auction and the Winner￿ s
Curse2
In the following, I will consider a ￿rst-price sealed-bid common value auction, in
which n risk-neutral bidders bid on an object of value s. Initially every bidder
shares the same common prior about s, which, for simplicity, is assumed to be
uniformly distributed on the real line R.3 Before bidding, each bidder i receives a
signal xi that is independently drawn from a uniform distribution over the interval
[s￿ a
2;s+ a
2], where a can be interpreted as the underlying uncertainty about the true
object value s: Bidders submit bids bi, the bidder with the highest bid is declared
the winner and pays his/her bid to receive the object, while the remaining bidders
pay and receive nothing.
There are di⁄erent ways to de￿ne the winner￿ s curse. In particular, because I am
dealing with situations in which the common value and the individual signals are
random variables, I distinguish between losses that can be attributed to ￿bad luck￿
on the one hand and losses that stem from systematic errors made by the bidders
on the other. A precise de￿nition is found in Kagel and Levin (2002), which again
is based on Capen, Clapp and Campbell￿ s (1971) original idea.
De￿nition 1 In any symmetric equilibrium, the winning bidder is the one with the
highest signal. Consequently, while the signal is an unbiased estimator for the true
value for the average bidder, the winner￿ s signal is an upwardly biased estimator.
2The following description follows closely that of Eyster and Rabin (2002).
3Strictly speaking, the uniform distribution over the real line is not de￿ned but can be thought
of as the limit of the uniform distribution on [￿K;K] as K ! 1, see Klemperer (1999). For
practical reasons, in the experiment to be described in the next section, attention is restricted to
uniform distributions over a subset of the real line.
4The winner￿ s curse refers to the systematic failure to account for this adverse selec-
tion e⁄ect.
With this de￿nition, a bidder can experience the winner￿ s curse even if his/her
winning bid yields positive pro￿t, as long as the average pro￿t is smaller than he/she
(erroneously) expected at the time of bidding. The above de￿nition of the winner￿ s
curse is often not very useful for practical purposes, because it is very demanding of
information. Moreover, in cases in which one has the necessary data, because the
winner￿ s curse is associated with less than perfect rationality, the curse might be
expected to occur most of the time (or all the time), and sometimes in situations
involving substantial gains for the winners. By contrast, the perhaps more intuitive
de￿nition of Eyster and Rabin (2005) is tied to whether or not the winner￿ s expected
pro￿t is negative.
De￿nition 2 Bidder i su⁄ers the winner￿ s curse in the auction￿ s equilibrium if:
E
￿
(s ￿ bi(xi))1fbi(xi)>maxj6=i bj(xj)g
￿
< 0;
where bi(xi) is the equilibrium bidding function and 1fAg is the indicator function
that takes the value one when A occurs and zero otherwise.
This de￿nition implies that a bidder su⁄ers the winner￿ s curse if the expected
value of the object conditional on winning is less than the price conditional on
winning.
To analyse the winner￿ s curse, I follow Eyster and Rabin (2005) in constructing
what they call a ￿￿-virtual￿ game: the perceived utility of bidder i from winning the
auction at a price p when the value of the object is s is given by:
(1 ￿ ￿)s + ￿E [sjxi] ￿ p: (1)
This means that bidder i￿ s perceived valuation of the object is a ￿￿weighted aver-
age of the object￿ s true value and the bidder￿ s expectation of its value given his/her
signal. Completely rational bidders have ￿ = 0 and choose the bid function to maxi-
mize the expected value of the object and the winning bid, taking into consideration
5the fact that when one￿ s own bid is the winning bid, all other players￿bids must be
lower and therefore convey information that one￿ s own signal is biased (the high-
est). By contrast, na￿ve bidders (￿ = 1) choose their bid function to maximize the
di⁄erence between the expected value of the object and the winning bid, but they
do not consider the bad news from having the highest bid, and therefore base their
bids on the unconditional expected value of the item. This allows for situations in
which the bidders are somewhat na￿ve, with ￿ taking any value in the interval [0;1].
However, it is assumed that all bidders are equally rational: di⁄erent bidders do not
have di⁄erent ￿.





n (xi;y) + ￿r(xi) ￿ bi]fn (yjxi)dy; (2)
where n is the number of bidders, vn(xi;y) = E[sjxi;maxj6=ifxjg = y] is bidder i￿ s
expectation of the value of the object conditional on his/her signal being xi and
the highest of the other bidders￿signals being y, r(xi) = E[sjxi] = xi is bidder
i￿ s expectation of the value of the object conditional on his/her signal xi, bj(￿) is
the common equilibrium bidding function of bidders j 6= i and fn is the density
of y conditional on xi.With s being drawn from a uniform distribution on R and






, I derive the following equilibrium bid function4:
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Intuitively, when ￿ = 0;bn (xi) = xi ￿ a
2, which is approximately the risk-neutral
Nash equilibrium (RNNE) (see e.g., Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Kagel and Levin
(1986)). At the other extreme, if ￿ = 1, bidders assume that there is no connection
between each bidder￿ s action and his/her type (he/she bids because he/she is in
a situation with positive private a¢ liated values). This is the na￿ve strategic dis-
counting case described by Kagel and Levin (1986), involving bn (xi) = xi ￿ a
n: In
4Details are found in Appendix A
6the latter case, as a response to an increase in the number of bidders, the bidders
will bid more aggressively because the competition is increasing. In the former case,
the increased competition e⁄ect is exactly o⁄set by the adverse selection e⁄ect. For
a given object value s, the expected highest signal is given by:






The seller￿ s expected revenue is increasing in n, and his/her expected revenue will
be given by:
E [b








n ￿ n ￿
2 + ￿ +
p
9￿2 + 4￿ + 4
2￿
; (6)
the seller￿ s expected revenue is larger than s and bidders are facing the winner￿ s
curse.5. From (3), one may also compute ￿ by:
￿ =







While Eyster and Rabin (2005) mainly focus on second-price sealed-bid auctions
in their paper, they also present data from Kagel and Levin￿ s (1986) experiment
to comment on the ￿￿cursed equilibrium theory for ￿rst-price sealed-bid auctions.6
Eyster and Rabin ￿nd that in 12 of 15 auctions, ￿ falls inside the admissible interval
￿ 2 [0;1]; and ￿ does not seem to be sensitive to changes in the number of bidders.
In Kagel and Levin￿ s (1986) experiment, only 71% of the auctions were won
by the high signal holder. This is inconsistent with both RNNE and ￿￿cursed
equilibrium, because these are both symmetric equilibria. It may stem from bidders
making errors in bidding (that is, noise), or if bidders have di⁄erent ￿. Hence,
5In a symmetric ￿-cursed equilibrium, bidders do not fully account for the fact that they only
win the object if they have the most positive information of the object. Clearly, any positive ￿
will lead to the Winner￿ s Curse described in De￿nition 1, while the winner￿ s curse in De￿nition 2
will occur i⁄ ￿ and the number of bidders are high enough.
6In the working paper version of "Cursed Equilibrium", ￿rst-price sealed-bid auctions are stud-
ied more closely (Eyster and Rabin (2002)).
7from other experiments, it remains ambiguous whether ￿ depends on the number of
bidders. Kagel and Levin￿ s (1986) results indicated that ￿ is insensitive to changes
in the number of bidders. In the other experiments cited in Eyster and Rabin (2002),
uncertainty, a, also varied. To study these results further, the experiment in this
paper tests whether ￿ is dependent on the number of bidders, and hence uncertainty
was held constant throughout the experiment.
3 The Experiment
The experiment was conducted with 32 undergraduate economic students at the
University of Bergen. The experiment was fully computerized using the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher (1999)). No communication between bidders was allowed. The
auction structure followed Kagel and Levin (1986), and the experiment lasted for
about 1.5 hours. Each bidder was given a paper with information and space for
his/her own notes. A short version of the information was also displayed on bid-
ders￿computer screens during the experiment. Questions concerning the structure
of the experiment were asked and answered privately (on the computer). Before the
experiment started, the bidders competed in three ￿ dry￿runs that had no in￿ uence
on their ￿nal payo⁄ (to ensure that they understood the structure and the way the
computer program worked). Bidders then answered some control questions before
the experiment started. First, 16 of the students (dubbed Session 1) participated in
20 auctions with n = 4 (dubbed Series 1) before they bid 20 rounds with n = 8 (Se-
ries 2). The remaining 16 students (Session 2) did the reverse. Table 1 summarizes
the experimental design.
Each auction was a ￿rst-price sealed-bid common value auction. In each auction,
one item (exempli￿ed as a jar of pennies) was up for sale, and the bidders learned
that the true value, s; of this item was drawn from a uniform distribution on the
interval [xL;xH] = [50;250] (Norwegian Kroner (NOK)). Next, each bidder i drew






where a was set to equal 50 NOK in all the auctions.7 Finally, the bidders posted
7This structure ensures that xi is an unbiased estimate of the true value s, or can be used to
8# of bidders # of observations
Session Series Auction # (# of groups) Experience  (# of winning observations)
4 320
(4) (80)
8 Series 1 320
(2) (20 auctions) (40)
8 320
(2) (40)
4 Series 3 320








1 1 1-20 None
Table 1: Experimental design
sealed bids, and the highest bidder won the object and paid his/her bid, and others
paid zero and received nothing.8
Compared with the auction described in the previous section, in which bidders
only know that s is drawn from a uniform distribution over the real line, bidders
in the experiment have more precise information. In particular, if they receive a
signal that is near the ends of the support for s (that is, if they draw a signal
xi 2 [50;75] or xi 2 [225;250]), the support of the conditional distribution shrinks.
Perhaps less intuitive at ￿rst glance, also for xi 2 [75;225], equilibrium bidding
is di⁄erent from what is found in the previous section, because of the fact that
bids are interlinked across signals (the optimal bidding functions are necessarily
continuous). It can be shown, however, that the equilibrium derived in the previous
section is a good approximation of equilibrium bidding in the experimental setting
for xi > xL + a
2 = 75 (see Kagel and Levin (1986) for details). I therefore use the
bidding functions derived in the previous section to calculate the value of ￿ for each
individual bidder in each auction.
￿nd an unbiased estimate with the boundary values xL;xH: Given xi;a and the boundary values,











true value s. The limits associated with a given xi were reported on the screen together with xi:
The distribution of the signal values and the interval [xL;xH]= [50;250] and uncertainty a = 50
remained constant during the experiment and were posted as common knowledge. Before each
auction, the bidders were informed about the number of bidders in the auction. Bids had to be
non-negative and had to be given in whole NOK.
8If two or more bidders had the same winning bid, they shared the pro￿t or the loss.
9To cover for the possibility of losses, each bidder was given an initial endowment
of NOK 200 (approximately $32 or e25). Pro￿ts and losses were added and sub-
tracted from this endowment. If a bidder￿ s endowment became negative, he/she had
to leave the experiment. Each bidder￿ s endowment after the experiment was paid
as a fee for participating in the experiment.
In each auction round, the following information was displayed on each par-
ticipant￿ s computer screen before bidding: a brief description of the rules of the
auction, the number of bidders, own (remaining) endowment, the individual￿ s signal
for the present auction, and the highest and lowest possible value of the object cor-
responding to this signal. After bidding, the following information was displayed:
the highest (winning) bid, the true value of the object, one￿ s own pro￿t or loss, one￿ s
own new endowment, and a history box showing own bids, highest bids, object value
and own pro￿t from previous auctions. With this information at hand, each bidder
could easily compute the winner￿ s pro￿t, but the identity of the winner remained
secret. After the last auction, all bidders answered a questionnaire about how they
formed their strategies and how changes in the number of bidders in an auction
a⁄ected their bidding.
4 Experimental Results
The bidders answered the control questions before the experiment started. In the
￿rst session, 11 answered all the questions correctly, and in Session 2, 13 answered
correctly. For the bidders with incorrect answers, the error was not of a nature
that one would expect to in￿ uence their performance. Among the eight bidders who
answered incorrectly, six earned more than the average, and the last two earned
below average but well above the poorest result. The bidders earned a total of NOK
4824, which gives an average payment of NOK 150.75 to each bidder. None of the
bidders went bankrupt.
Auctions with signals above 225 or below 75 are not reported in the results be-
cause the bid function described in the previous section is only a good approximation
for signals in between these two values, and the bid function therefore cannot be
10used to calculate ￿. When removing these data, there are 176 winning observa-


















1 46 139.13 137.91 130.98 -6.93 -4.17
(1) (142.72) (143.3)
2 34 151.29 150.15 144.06 -6.19 -8.18
(1) (158.71) (159.47)
3 31 174.00 172.93 168.76 -3.65 -9.58
(2) (181.19) (183.58)




-5.30* Average 176 153.00* -5.42*
*weighted by number of auctions in each series.



































1 46 13/46 22/46 129/184 46/46 -4.17 21.41 8.91 2.05
(1) (4) (28.26%) (47.83%) (70.11%) (100%) (3.21)** (4.57) (4.57) (0.62)
2 34 4/34 21/34 268/272 34/34 -8.18 17.59 -1.16 1.37
(1) (8) (11.76%) (61.76%) (98.53%) (100%) (8.49)** (2.83) (2.83) (0.31)
3 31 3/31 15/31 237/248 31/31 -9.58 17.9 -1.04 1.46
(2) (8) (9.68%) (48.39%) (95.56%) (100%) (9.25)** (2.52) (2.52) (0.28)
4 65 28/65 34/65 233/260 65/65 -2.55 21.26 8.76 1.91
(2) (4) (43.08%) (52.31%) (89.62%) (100%) (3.92)** (4.42) (4.42) (0.4)
48/176 92/176 867/964 176/176 -5.3* 20* 5.16* 1.76*
(27.27%) (52.27%) (89.94%) (100%)
Average
* weighted by number of auctions in each series.
** statistically signi￿cant di⁄erent from zero 0.5% level two-tail t-test.
Table 3: Summary statistics II
Only 48 of the 176 auctions gave the winner a positive pro￿t, and just 52% of
the auctions were won by the high signal holder. In all series, the average pro￿t for
the winner was negative, with an average loss of NOK 5.30 in each auction. Bidders
11did on average bid less than their signal, but the average di⁄erence between signal
and bid was only NOK 5.42. In this setting, the di⁄erence needed to overcome the
winner￿ s curse was NOK 15 with four bidders and NOK 20 with eight bidders. .
This suggests that the bidders in part ignored the adverse selection problem and
faced the winner￿ s curse. Moreover, they did not seem to change their adjustment
signi￿cantly when the number of bidders was changed. Table 4 presents subjects￿
pro￿t and their estimated ￿ for each series.
χ series 1 χ series 2 χ total χ series 3 χ series 4 χ total
 (st.dev)  (st.dev)  (st.dev)  (st.dev)  (st.dev)  (st.dev)
1.89 1.28 1.55 0.95 1.06 1.01
(0.10) (0.10) (0.32) (0.15) (0.32) (0.26)
1.27 0.89 1.07 0.46* 1.15 0.83
(0.25) (0.12) (0.28) (0.35) (0.25) (0.46)
0.54* 0.36* 0.45* 1.30 1.88 1.59
(0.27) (0.18) (0.24) (0.07) (0.10) (0.31)
0.75 0.39* 0.55* 1.20 1.84 1.53
(0.32) (0.13) (0.29) (0.20) (0.79) (0.66)
1.85 1.21 1.47 1.13 1.60 1.36
(0.07) (0.05) (0.33) (0.33) (0.18) (0.35)
1.39 1.17 1.27 0.99 1.45 1.22
(0.50) (0.26) (0.39) (0.49) (0.61) (0.59)
0.60* 0.45* 0.51* 1.18 1.76 1.47
(0.55) (0.14) (0.35) (0.41) (0.23) (0.44)
1.10 1.12 1.11 1.18 2.03 1.61
(0.73) (0.43) (0.57) (0.39) (0.30) (0.55)
1.86 0.94 1.31 1.29 1.25 1.27
(0.42) (0.35) (0.59) (0.61) (0.34) (0.48)
1.23 1.26 1.24 1.67 1.90 1.79
(0.98) (0.11) (0.65) (0.13) (0.16) (0.19)
1.35 0.89 1.09 1.28 1.66 1.47
(1.03) (0.39) (0.77) (0.47) (0.40) (0.47)
1.93 1.44 1.66 1.47 2.11 1.79
(0.41) (0.28) (0.42) (0.06) (0.12) (0.33)
2.38 1.55 1.89 0.93 1.04 0.99
(0.13) (0.07) (0.43) (0.59) (0.56) (0.56)
1.27 1.39 1.33 1.26 1.90 1.59
(0.79) (0.21) (0.54) (0.40) (0.46) (0.54)
1.92 1.16 1.49 1.39 1.32 1.35
(1.06) (0.32) (0.81) (0.34) (0.57) (0.46)
2.17 1.43 1.76 1.41 1.77 1.60
(0.76) (0.34) (0.67) (0.56) (0.69) (0.65)
Average 148.75 1.47 1.06 1.24 Average 152.75 1.2 1.6 1.40
 (st.dev) (53.42) (0.80) (0.44) (0.65)  (st.dev) (28.62) (0.46) (0.55) (0.54)
Session 1 Session 2
Bidder Profit Bidder Profit
5 209 22 200
8 209 19 198
7 200 32 173
15 200 30 170
14 188 21 169
11 183 18 167
9 173 26 161
10 166 28 161
4 165 31 158
3 148 17 150
6 126 24 138
16 114 20 136
2 102 25 129
12 84 23 121
13 82 27 119
1 31 29 94
* Statistically smaller than one at 2.5% signi￿cance level one-tail t-test
Table 4: Individual chi and pro￿t in the experiment
124.1 Summary of Findings
From Table 2 - 4 there are several interesting ￿ndings.
1. The experiment participants did not bid in accordance with ￿￿cursed
equilibrium. Only 3 of the 32 students were found to have their estimated
parameter within the admissible interval; for the remaining 29 students, the
estimated ￿ was statistically signi￿cantly larger than one. This suggests that
typical bidders are more na￿ve (or less sophisticated) than is possible within
the ￿￿cursed equilibrium framework, which motivates me to extend the model
by allowing bidders to be even more na￿ve.
2. Bidders seem to be more ￿-cursed with four than eight bidders.
This suggests that ￿ is sensitive to the number of bidders. From the results,
it seems that ￿ declines with the number of bidders (cf. table 4). In the two
sessions, 27 of the 32 bidders had a lower ￿ with eight bidders compared with
the setting with four bidders.
3. From Table 4, it is also clear that there is substantial variation in the
individual cursedness parameters within each auction series. There
seems to be an inverse relationship between individual ￿ and individual ag-
gregate pro￿t: typically, the individuals with a pro￿t of 200 are the least
cursed bidders; they do not win auctions in this setting. Moreover, bidders
with above-average pro￿t have a lower ￿ on average than bidders with below-
average pro￿t.
4. Winning bidders typically have a higher ￿ than losing bidders. The
average high bidder had an estimated ￿ of 1.76, while the average bidder￿ s ￿
was 1.33. That only 52% of the auctions were won by the bidder with the
highest signal is a further indication of this, because in a symmetric setting,
all the auctions should be won by the bidder with highest signal.
5. Bidding behaviour described by the participants also indicates het-
erogeneity in ￿. Descriptions from participants in the panel vary from
13￿bidding as low as possible to earn as much as possible￿(earned NOK 114)
to ￿tried to think strategically, bid as much as possible￿(earned NOK 31).
Bidding patterns varied substantially, and bidders responded to the change in
the number of participants in various ways. In the ￿rst session, seven bidders
responded that the change from four to eight bidders did not a⁄ect their bid
behaviour. In the second session, only two bidders reported this. In Session
1 (Session 2), eight (￿ve) bidders reported that the increase in the number of
bidders probably a⁄ected their chance of winning.9
In summary: there is heterogeneity among bidders, because ￿ seems to di⁄er be-
tween the individuals. ￿￿cursed equilibrium seems not to describe the behaviour of
the individuals. They fall outside the admissible interval, and ￿￿cursed equilibrium
is not independent of the number of bidders. In the next section, I discuss these
￿ndings.
5 A Model for Less Sophisticated Bidders
As shown above, ￿￿cursed equilibrium does not give a good description of the
inexperienced bidders￿behaviour. In particular, most of the participants turn out
to be more na￿ve than what is possible within the ￿￿cursed equilibrium framework.
I here propose an alternative model, based on a di⁄erent description of the most
na￿ve bidders: they simply bid their signals. Next I follow Eyster and Rabin (2005)
in assuming that partly na￿ve bidders have a bid function that is a weighted average
of the RNNE bid function and the bidder￿ s individual signal xi.10 Bidders will
then, in a worst-case scenario, not only ignore the adverse selection problem but
also ignore the distribution of signals, and will only focus on their own signal as
9An interesting bid pattern was described by one of the bidders (earned NOK 173): ￿In the ￿rst
rounds, I focused on my signal, and this led to losses. I recognized that there were losses in almost
every run, and then decided to play strategically: ￿rst I bid NOK 5 over the lowest possible value.
Then I changed this to NOK 7 above, then 10 and in the end NOK 12 above the lowest possible
value￿ . This bidder did not change her bidding behaviour when the number of bidders increased.
It seems that the bidder was on the way to the Nash Equilibrium, but aggressive bidding from
others drove her away from this.
10True, this may seem a rather extreme description of bidding, but 10% of bids in series 1 and
15% of bids in series 3 were within +/- 1 of the bidders signal.
14an unbiased estimator of the true value of the object. The weight assigned to the
most na￿ve bid function will be denoted ￿; and the corresponding equilibrium will
be called a ￿￿cursed equilibrium.
Let bn
￿=0 = bn
￿=0 = xi ￿ a
2 denote the RNNE bid function and let bn
￿=1 = xi
denote the bid function of our most na￿ve bidders. Then the ￿￿cursed equilibrium
bid function is a weighted average of bn
￿=0 and bn
￿=1, the symmetric bid function
given by:
b(xi) = (1 ￿ ￿)(xi ￿
a
2
) + ￿xi (8)




when ￿ = 0; the bid function is described by RNNE, and bidding behaviour is
independent of the number of bidders (as in the ￿￿cursed equilibrium). When
￿ = 1, the bid is independent of the number of bidders and of uncertainty. The
bidders only focus on their signal as an unbiased estimator of the true value of the
object.
We can now use the bid function in (8) on the experimental data to calculate the
values of ￿ for each bidder in each auction, just as when calculating ￿. Alternatively
one may exploit the functional relationship between the two parameters: because

















that is, ￿ is proportional to ￿, where the proportionality factor n￿2
n is either 1
2 (for
n = 4) or 3
4 (for n = 8). The seller￿ s expected income in a ￿￿cursed equilibrium is
given by:
E [b







15The seller￿ s expected income will then be larger than s and bidders will face the





so, when ￿ = 1, the bidders face the winner￿ s curse even when there are only two
bidders. Because ￿ allows for less-rational bidders than ￿; it is clear that it should
capture more of the bidder￿ s behaviour than does ￿. This is con￿rmed in the scatter
plot in Figure 1, where more bid data fall within the ￿-model than within the ￿-
model.
Table 5 summarizes the estimated ￿ in the experiment, and Table 6 compares
the results for winning bidders and all bidders for ￿ and ￿:11 By examining these
tables, it is apparent that ￿ is less in￿ uenced by n than is ￿. This is con￿rmed in
our data by a paired t-test; ￿ is signi￿cantly larger with eight bidders compared
with four bidders in both Sessions 1 and 2 at 1% signi￿cance level. Applying this
test to ￿ gives less signi￿cant results: the di⁄erence for the bidders in Session 1 is
insigni￿cant, while in Session 2 it is signi￿cant at a 5% signi￿cance level.
5.1 Summary of Findings
1. By applying this model, 27 of the 32 bidders fall inside the de￿nition area.
The ￿￿cursed equilibrium seems to give a better description of bidders￿
behaviour. They are far away from that prescribed by the RNNE (￿ = 0)
and seem to apply a strategy where their own signal is given much weight





in auctions with four bidders, 28 of the 32 bidders have a ￿ that is smaller than
1 (corresponding to ￿ ￿ 2), and in auctions with eight bidders, 24 bidders have
￿ smaller than 1 (￿ ￿ 1;33). This is not surprising given the fact that the
￿￿cursed equilibrium allows bidders to be ￿less￿rational than the ￿￿cursed



































Figure 1: Scatter plot of bid data
17ø series 1 ø series 2 ø total ø series 3 ø series 4 ø total
 (st.dev)  (st.dev)  (st.dev)  (st.dev)  (st.dev)  (st.dev)
0.95* 0.96* 0.95* 0.71* 0.53* 0.61*
(0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.11) (0.16) (0.17)
0.63* 0.67* 0.65* 0.35* 0.57* 0.47*
(0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.26) (0.13) (0.23)
0.27* 0.27* 0.27* 0.97* 0.94* 0.96*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.38* 0.29* 0.33* 0.90* 0.92 0.91
(0.16) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.40) (0.30)
0.93* 0.91* 0.91* 0.85* 0.80* 0.82*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.25) (0.09) -(0.19)
0.69* 0.88 0.80* 0.75* 0.72* 0.73*
(0.25) (0.19) (0.24) (0.37) (0.31) (0.33)
0.30* 0.34* 0.32* 0.88 0.88* 0.88*
(0.28) (0.10) (0.18) (0.31) -(0.12) (0.23)
0.55* 0.84 0.71* 0.89 1.02 0.95
(0.37) (0.32) (0.37) (0.29) (0.15) (0.24)
0.93 0.70* 0.80* 0.97 0.62* 0.79*
(0.21) (0.26) (0.26) (0.46) (0.17) (0.38)
0.61* 0.94* 0.80* 1.25 0.95* 1.09
(0.49) (0.08) (0.37) (0.10) (0.08) (0.18)
0.67 0.66* 0.67* 0.96 0.83* 0.89
(0.52) (0.29) (0.40) (0.35) (0.20) (0.29)
0.96 1.08 1.03 1.11 1.05 1.08
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
1.19 1.16 1.17 0.70* 0.52* 0.60*
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.44) (0.28) (0.36)
0.63* 1.04 0.87* 0.94 0.95 0.95
(0.40) (0.16) (0.35) (0.30) (0.23) (0.26)
0.96 0.87 0.91 1.04 0.66* 0.84*
(0.53) (0.24) (0.39) (0.25) (0.28) (0.33)
1.09 1.07 1.08 1.06 0.89 0.97
(0.38) (0.25) (0.31) (0.42) (0.35) (0.39)
Average 148.75 0.74* 0.80* 0.77* Average 152.75 0.90* 0.80* 0.85*
 (st.dev) (53.42) (0.40) (0.33) (0.27)  (st.dev) (28.62) (0.34) (0.27) (0.17)
Session 1 Session 2
Bidder Profit Bidder Profit
5 209 22 200
8 209 19 198
7 200 32 173
15 200 30 170
14 188 21 169
11 183 18 167
9 173 26 161
10 166 28 161
4 165 31 158
3 148 17 150
6 126 24 138
16 114 20 136
2 102 25 129
12 84 23 121
13 82 27 119
1 31 29 94
* Statistically smaller than one at 2.5% signi￿cance level one-tail t-test
Table 5: Individual phi and pro￿t in the experiment.
1 1 2.05 1.47 1.03 0.74
1 2 1.37 1.06 1.03 0.80
2 3 1.46 1.20 1.10 0.90
2 4 1.91 1.60 0.96 0.80











* Weighted by the number of observations
Table 6: chi and phi for winning bidder and all bidders
18equilibrium.
2. A change in the number of bidders does not seem to in￿ uence ￿,
suggesting that bidders focus on their own signal and not the adverse selection
problem they face. Eyster and Rabin (2002) comment that ￿ seems to be
insensitive to changes in the number of bidders using the data of Kagel and
Levin (1986). In this experiment, this is not true: ￿ decreases as the number
of bidders increases. This is also con￿rmed by a paired t-test for individual
bidders in each session.
6 Concluding Remarks
Empirical as well as experimental evidence strongly suggests that bidders in common
value auctions typically do not conform to the requirements of perfect rationality.
Therefore, descriptive models of such auctions should allow for less than perfectly
rational bidding. What is less clear, however, is how this should be done. The start-
ing point for this paper is one suggested way to model less-than-perfect rationality,
Eyster and Rabin￿ s (2005) notion of ￿￿cursed equilibrium. They assume that bid-
ders maximize what they call a virtual utility function, which is a weighted average
of an assessment of utility based on a na￿ve belief about the relationship between
one￿ s own signal and the true value on the one hand and an assessment based on
the rational belief on the other hand. Eyster and Rabin proceed to demonstrate
that the equilibrium bid function then becomes a weighted average (with the same
weights) of the corresponding ￿na￿ve￿and ￿rational￿bid functions.
The participants in the experiment reported in this paper turned out not to ￿t
the ￿￿cursed equilibrium model very well: the estimated weights were often outside
the admissible interval, a ￿nding that is not very surprising, keeping in mind that
even the completely na￿ve version of ￿￿cursed equilibrium (￿ = 1) bidders are
assumed to be quite sophisticated: they perfectly predict the distribution of their
competitors￿bids. I also ￿nd that the estimated cursedness parameters are shown
to depend on the number of bidders, a ￿nding that does not ￿t the theory.
19The broader version of the theory, ￿￿cursed equilibrium, proposed in this paper,
in which fully rational bidders still play the Nash equilibrium while the least rational
bidders possible simply bid their signals, turns out to ￿t the experimental data
better: most of the out-of-range parameters disappear, and the new cursedness
parameter turns out to be more stable across the number of bidders.
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20Appendix
A The Bid Strategy in ￿-Cursed Equilibrium





n (xi;y) + ￿r(xi) ￿ bi]fn (yjxi)dy; (13)
where vn(xi;y) = E[sjxi;maxj6=ifxjg = y] is bidder i￿ s expectation of the value
of the object conditional on his/her signal being xi and the highest of the other
bidders￿signals being y, r(xi) = E[sjxi] = xi is bidder i￿ s expectation of the value of
the object conditional on his/her signal xi, bj() is the common equilibrium bidding
function of bidders j 6= i and fn is the density of y conditional on xi.
Maximizing (2) with respect to the bid bi yields the following ￿rst-order condition
(after simpli￿cation and exploiting the symmetry condition b
￿1
j (bi) = xi):
dbn(xi)
dxi
= ((1 ￿ ￿)v





where Fn is the C.D.F. that corresponds to the density fn. With s being drawn
from a uniform distribution on R and the signals subsequently being independently










































Moreover, vn(xi;xi) = xi ￿ a
2 + a
n (see Eyster and Rabin, ((2002)) and r(xi) = xi.














21This is a linear ￿rst-order di⁄erential equation with solution:
b







Intuitively, when ￿ = 0;bn (xi) = xi ￿ a
2, which is the RNNE as described by, for
example, Milgrom and Weber (1982). At the other extreme, if ￿ = 1, we have a
situation where the bidders assume that there is no connection between each bidder￿ s
action and his/her type. This is the na￿ve strategic discounting case described by
Kagel and Levin (1986), involving bn (xi) = xi ￿ a
n: In the latter case, as a response
to an increase in the number of bidders, the bidders will bid more because the
competition is increasing. In the former case, the increased competition e⁄ect is
exactly o⁄set by the adverse selection e⁄ect.
B Instructions for the experiment
Below is a translation of the information provided to participants in the experiment
before the experiment started. The original information was given in Norwegian.
Introduction
You are now going to participate in a series of auctions. The information lea￿ et
consists of three pages and you can consult this lea￿ et throughout the experiment.
All participants receive the same information. No communication is allowed during
the experiment. If you have any practical questions about the information or the
experiment, raise your hand and you will be assisted. On the back of this lea￿ et
you can make your own notes if necessary.
Auction background
In the experiment you are going to participate in a series of auctions. In total
there are 40 auctions. That implies that you are going to make 40 bids. The
experiment is divided into two parts, each with 20 auctions. At the start of each
auction, you are told how many participants (including yourself) will be taking part
22in the auction. In the ￿rst part you will face the same opponents in all 20 auctions.
In the second part you will get new opponents for the ￿nal 20 auctions.
After the 40 auctions you will be asked to ￿ll out a questionnaire with background
information and questions relating to the experiment.
Before we start the experiment everybody has to read through these pages. We
will also arrange a trial round with three auctions that is without implications for
the results, so that you gain an impression of how the experiment will work. You
will also be given some control questions.
Execution of the auction
In all auctions a jar of pennies is sold. The glass itself is worthless; it is just the
money in the jar that is of value. The person with the highest bid wins the auction.
The person who wins gets the money in the jar but has to pay his/her bid.
Example: If the value in the jar is NOK 100 and highest bid is NOK 80, the
winner wins NOK 20. However, if the value in the jar is NOK 100 and the highest
bid is NOK 120, the winner loses NOK 20.
Exactly how much money there is in the jar is UNKNOWN and is changed for
every auction. The value will always be between NOK 50 and NOK 250. It is the
same probability for all whole NOK values between NOK 50 and NOK 250. By that
it is meant that it is just as likely that the value is NOK 64 as it is 225.
Before each auction you each get an own signal on the value in the jar. The signal
could be higher or lower than the true value in the jar. The signal is maximally
NOK 25 above the true value and maximally NOK 25 below the true value. This
signal on how much is in the jar tells you what is the highest and lowest value of
the jar.
Example: On the computer screen you get a signal: NOK 75. The value that
actually is in the jar can then vary over all whole NOK values from NOK 50 to
NOK 100. The lowest possible value based on this signal is NOK 50, while the
highest possible value based on this signal is NOK 100.
Bids have to be in whole NOK.
Example: One may bid NOK 58 but not NOK 58.50
23Everybody gets NOK 200 to use in the experiment. The money is split evenly
between the two series, so that one gets NOK 100 for the ￿rst 20 auctions and then
another NOK 100 for the last 20 auctions. This money does not limit how much
you may bid; it is used to compute gains or losses for the winner of the auction.
Hence, you may each bid whatever NOK amount you wish.
Example: It is the ￿rst auction and the signal one gets is NOK 175. The lowest
possible value based on this signal is NOK 150 and the highest possible value is NOK
200. One may bid whatever one wishes; you are not limited by only having NOK
100 in endowment. If the highest bid is NOK 175 and it turns out that the true
value is NOK 180, the person with the highest bid wins NOK 5. This sum is added
to the NOK 100 in endowment, so that person now has NOK 105. If the highest bid
instead were NOK 185, that person would have lost NOK 5 and had NOK 95 when
the next auction started.
If you lose all your money you will be eliminated from the experiment.
The money you have when all auctions are completed is your own and will be
paid after the experiment is over. Only the winner￿ s endowment is changed in each
auction. Those whose bid was not highest in an auction see no change in their
endowment. (If there is more than one highest bid, these share the gain or loss
evenly.)
After each auction you will be told: how much money there was in the jar, what
the highest bid was, your eventual gain/loss and your new endowment. In addition
an information box appears that shows the history from previous auctions. Here
you are told: your bid, the highest bid, the value in the jar and the winner￿ s pro￿t.
After you have read this information a new round begins.
No communication is allowed during the experiment. If you have any
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